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International institutions and domestic policy: assessing the influence of 
multilateral pressure on the European Union’s Agricultural Policy    
 
There is a debate in international relations on how, when, and why international 
institutions influence domestic policy. This article contributes to this debate by looking 
at the influence of the World Trade Organization (WTO) on the European Union’s (EU) 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). It shows that the transfer of authority to 
international institutions may transform an external factor into a permanent influence on 
domestic policy.  The transfer of authority in agriculture to the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT - now included in the WTO) in 1994 led to the introduction of 
a dormant clause on export subsidies in all subsequent EU CAP regulations. This clause 
provided the legal foundation for the 2015 EU decision to remove export subsidies. 
Multilateral pressure (i.e., the demands of third countries in GATT/WTO negotiations) 
is not the only determinant of CAP, but it is important, and its influence is affected by 
GATT/WTO having authority on agriculture. 
 
Keywords: European Union, Common Agricultural Policy, GATT, World Trade 
Organization, international institutions, second image reverse, authority transfer. 
 
Introduction 
There is a debate in international relations on how, when, and why international 
institutions influence domestic policy. This paper focuses predominantly on the ‘when’. 
More specifically, it looks at whether international institutions’ influence on domestic 
policy increases when there is transfer of authority. This question emerges from two 
strands of literature: the second image reverse (SIR) research, and research on the 
politicization of international authority. Inverting the directional logic of the images of 
Waltz, Gourevitch (1978) introduced the idea that the international system (third image) 
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also affected the structure of states (second image): the second image reverse.   
According to this literature, the capacity of international institutions to alter domestic 
policy depends on their strength, because ‘international institutions embodied in 
toothless, non-binding agreements should have less influence … than fully-fledged 
international institutions including binding treaties and regular meetings of multilateral 
fora’ (Costa and Jørgensen 2012, 6). The strength of international institutions is also not 
static. While analysing the nexus between politicization and international authority, 
Zürn, Binder and Ecker-Ehrhardt (2012, 83) remind us that international institutions’ 
strength is related to authority transfer (with the granting of competence to make certain 
decisions and judgements). The hypothesis that emerges is that a transfer of authority to 
an international organization increases its capacity to influence domestic policies.  
 
We assess this hypothesis using the European Union (EU) (rather than the 
Member States) as the ‘second image’. That is, the EU is the ‘domestic’ entity, with an 
internal single market. The EU was a contracting party to the updated General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and is a full member of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO). Moreover, agricultural policy is a common, internal, EU policy, 
and the EU is a political subject that engages internationally on agricultural products, 
where there is reason to believe it is influenced by international institutions (Costa and 
Jørgensen, 2012, 2).  In treating the EU as the ‘domestic’ entity on which influence is 
exerted, yet where this influence also flows to the Member States through the EU’s 
common policy, we are in effect creating a ‘reverse second image plus’. Thus, this 
article looks at the influence of an international institution (the WTO) on another 
international institution (the EU) which in turn influences European member states’ 




The first specific transfer of authority on agriculture from the EU to another 
international institution took place in 1994. Agricultural products were included in 
GATT in 1947, but a few years later the United States (US) obtained a waiver of 
unlimited duration to protect its agricultural policy, thus allowing the then European 
Economic Community and other GATT members to also establish protectionist 
agricultural policies. While the US shifted towards a pro-liberalization position on 
agriculture in the 1960s, the Europeans, among others, resisted (Josling and 
Tangermann, 1996). As a result, agricultural liberalization was piecemeal, with 
agreements only on a few products, which were also subject to many formal GATT 
disputes (for details see Swinbank, 2016). After several years of difficult negotiations, 
the first agreement on agriculture was reached during the Uruguay Round of 
negotiations of the GATT (1986-1994). The agreement introduced specific limits on 
both domestic support and export subsidies, as well as increased market access; in other 
words, specific rules for the liberalization of trade in agricultural products. This meant 
that the newly minted WTO had expanded authority over agriculture (Daugbjerg, 
Farsund and Langhelle, 2017, 1704). Accompanying this transfer of authority was the 
replacement of the diplomacy-based Dispute Settlement Mechanism of the GATT with 
the quasi-judicial arm of the WTO.
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 Despite the initiation of a new Round of 
multilateral negotiations in 2001, the so-called WTO Doha Development Round (DDR), 
the Uruguay Round Agreement remained the only multilateral agreement on agriculture 
up until December 2015. At the WTO Ministerial hold in Nairobi in 2015, the WTO 
members reached agreement on a number of issues including the phasing out of export 




 To assess the hypothesis that authority transfer to an international organization 
(the GATT/WTO) increases its influence over domestic policies (here: the EU and its 
CAP), we look at the role played by multilateral pressure (i.e., the demands from third 
countries in GATT/WTO negotiations) on different CAP reforms. This is done through 
a review of both CAP legislation and the extensive literature on determinants of CAP 
reform. The analysis of CAP legislation shows that the influence of the Uruguay Round 
Agreement on Agriculture has been permanent. We show that this particular transfer of 
authority led to the introduction of a clause on export subsidies in a 1994 CAP 
regulation (Council of the EU, 1994, Art. 13), a clause that became a permanent feature 
of all subsequent CAP legislation. This clause, which allowed the EU to remove export 
subsidies without further legal or legislative ado, remained dormant for decades, until it 
facilitated the decision to remove export subsidies in the 2015 Nairobi WTO Ministerial 
Conference.  While we do not assess the degree of influence from multilateral pressure 
vis-à-vis domestic EU factors in affecting the CAP, our review of the existing literature 
on CAP determinants shows that multilateral pressure was not considered an 
influencing factor prior to negotiations on authority transfer in the Uruguay Round. 
While multilateral pressure is one of several determinants, and its influence varies 
across time, the transfer of authority on agriculture to GATT/WTO in 1994 increased its 
capacity to influence the CAP. These insights both qualify the existing research on the 
impact of multilateral pressure on CAP reforms and lend credence to our hypothesis.  
 
We divide the rest of this article into four sections. First, we provide a brief 
overview of the evolution of the CAP, identifying the different reforms that have taken 
place since its inception.
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 Next, we review CAP legislation showing that the influence 
of the 1994 transfer of authority to GATT/WTO on agriculture has been permanent. 
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Section three presents our review of the literature on the factors said to have determined 
CAP reforms, identifying their impact.  The last section concludes. 
 
Common Agricultural Policy Reforms 
 
Although the objectives of the CAP remain those set out in Article 39 of the Treaty of 
Rome, the policy itself has greatly changed since the 1960s. There is consensus in the 
literature (cited in table 3) that the transformation has occurred through six CAP 
reforms that have changed the number of instruments of the policy and/or modified the 
existing instruments (see table 1); it has not been the result of a one-off revision. Since 
each of these reforms changed the substance of the policy they have to be considered in 
our analysis of the role played by multilateral pressure, thus the objective of this section 
is to identify and briefly present each of them.  
 
(Table 1 here) 
 
 
Today the CAP consists of two pillars. One is fully funded through the EU 
budget, providing for market support and direct payments to farmers based on 
decoupling (payments to farmers not based on type of product or on quantity produced), 
cross-compliance (need to comply with environmental, animal health and food safety 
standards), and restricted border protection (limits to tariffs and quotas); Member States 
co-finance the other pillar, which is for rural development. This is quite a different CAP 
than the one established in the 1960s. Despite some modifications of existing 
instruments in the 1980s, the CAP was, until 1992, a commodity support policy based 
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on target prices,  generous border protection and export subsidies, all financed by the 
Community budget. The policy at this time also included a limited set of structural 
measures (for rural development) co-financed by the Member States.  
 
In 1992 the so-called MacSharry reform (named after the European 
Commissioner in charge of DG Agriculture at the time) introduced a new policy 
instrument and started the progressive removal of another; it began shifting assistance 
directly to producers (through income support and direct payments), replacing indirect 
support (tied to product prices and production). The new 1992 CAP regulations also 
introduced new measures on rural development (an agri-environmental programme, new 
subsidies for afforestation of agricultural land, and an early retirement scheme for 
farmers). Lastly, limits to border protection and to export subsidies were included in 
December 1994 to comply with the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture.  We 
include the review of CAP regulations that took place in December 1994 within the 
MacSharry reform, because the literature on the CAP’s evolution (table 3) views these 
as part of the 1992 reform. The 1992 reform is widely considered to have included all 
the policy changes necessary to reach a multilateral agreement on agriculture at the 
Uruguay Round. The December 1994 regulation added the limits to tariffs, quotas, and 
export subsidies resulting from the final Agreement on Agriculture (Council of the EU, 
1994).  
 
The following reform, in 1999, continued this shift; one finalized in 2003. A 
reduction of target prices accompanied a continued shift from indirect to direct 
payments. Farmers were now obliged to respect specified environmental, animal health 
and food safety standards (optional cross-compliance) to receive full payment of their 
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direct aid. The rural development arm of the CAP became the second pillar, and there 
was now a voluntary modulation (reduction of direct payments and transfer of money 
from the first pillar to the second pillar). The so-called Fischler reform (again, the name 
of the Commissioner in charge of CAP at the time) in 2003 made modulation 
compulsory and introduced another new instrument: decoupled direct payments. By so 
doing, it partially transformed support into a single flat-rate farm payment tied to 
compliance with environmental, animal health and welfare, and food safety regulations 
(compulsory cross-compliance) rather than with production requirements. For the new 
Member States (part of the 2004 enlargement) a simplified version of the single farm 
payment was introduced (starting at 25% of the EU15 rate in 2004) to progressively 
reduce the different treatment of ‘older’ and ‘newer’ members.  
 
While leaving unchanged the number of policy instruments, the 2008 reform 
assigned a greater emphasis on land-use and sustainability, solidified in a 2013 revision 
(the latest reform of the CAP), and resulting in a ‘greening’ of payments. While direct 
payments are still tied to land, land must be kept in good agricultural condition (cross-
compliance) and recipients must be farmers.  Funds for rural development can be used 
to address new challenges, such as climate change, renewable energies, water 
management and biodiversity, at the discretion of each Member State. By 2019, the 
Single Payment Scheme will introduce an EU wide flat area payment that implies a new 
distribution of payments among member states and among farmers.   
 
To sum up, the CAP has evolved from a commodity support policy based on 
target prices and strong protection against third country products, to a system of support 
with less competition-distorting support systems.  One of the latest EU decisions on 
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CAP is consistent with this evolution.
3
 In December 2015, the EU decided to remove, 
by January 2016, one of its oldest instruments of market support, namely its export 
subsidies for agricultural products.  
 
The Word Trade Organization’s Permanent Influence  
 
This section shows that the legal foundation for the EU 2015 decision to remove export 
subsidies was introduced in 1994. The transfer of authority in agriculture to the GATT 
led to the introduction of a clause regarding export subsidies, which was included in all 
subsequent CAP regulations, including the 2013 reform. This clause laid dormant until 
it provided the legal foundation for the 2015 EU decision. Following the 1994 
international Agreement on Agriculture, the WTO has thus been a permanent influence 
on the EU CAP, at least regarding export subsidies. The transfer of authority led not 
only to the introduction of new constraints (such as limits to export subsidies) on CAP 
but also the inclusion of new legal language in EU regulations; language that would 
facilitate further changes. This insight helps clarify the real impact of multilateral 
pressure on the 2013 reform and evidences that our hypothesis (that a transfer of 
authority to an international institution leads to greater capacity of influence in domestic 
policy) cannot be rejected.   
 
The Agreement on Agriculture reached at the Uruguay Round laid the 
foundations of trade liberalization for agricultural products. All parties to the agreement 
knew it was the beginning of a process where they would be expected to continue 
lowering tariffs, domestic subsidies and export subsidies through future agreements. 
Article 20 of the Agreement provided for the start of new negotiations in the year 2000, 
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‘Recognizing that the long-term objective of substantial progressive reductions in 
support and protection resulting in fundamental reform is an ongoing process, Members 
agree that negotiations for continuing the process will be initiated one year before the 
end of the implementation period,...’  
 
In the case of export subsidies, the EU introduced a legal provision  that allowed 
for their reduction or removal through new multilateral agreements. To be more 
specific, since December 1994, all CAP regulations have included a clause that 
subordinates EU export subsidies to the limits resulting from international agreements 
concluded in accordance with Article 228 (later Article 300) of the Treaty of the 
European Union (cf. table 2).   
 
(Table 2 here) 
 
Our analysis of CAP legislation therefore indicates that the EU decided, 
concomitant with the conclusion of Uruguay Round Agreement, to leave the door open 
to removing export subsidies without further legal changes in case an international 
agreement was reached after the transfer of authority to the WTO. When the 
negotiations foreseen by Article 20 materialized in the Doha Agenda of 2001, one of the 
commitments of the parties was to evetually phase out all forms of export subsidies to 
agricultural products (WTO Ministerial, 2001, point 13). While reaching a preliminary 
agreement at the WTO Ministerial of Hong Kong in 2005, a final agreement was sealed 
in December 2015, and in the EU case, made possible by the provision included in CAP 




At the WTO’s Ministerial in Nairobi in December 2015, the EU agreed to 
remove export subsidies from its market support instruments beginning in January 2016 
(with certain temporary exceptions for 1.35 million tons of sugar in 2017 and some 
support for dairy and pork until 2020). While previous CAP reforms, and the narrowing 
of global and EU market prices, had largely removed the need for export subsidies by 
2012,
4
 the removal of such an instrument would require a new revision of the CAP 
legislation and thus lengthy, and fraught, internal EU legislative wrangling. That is, 
unless existing legal provisions allowed for such a compromise. 
 
The 2013 reform did not include a phasing out of export subsidies despite some 
debate on the matter. As mentioned above, the WTO Ministerial Conference in Hong 
Kong in 2005 had reached a preliminary agreement to that effect: 
We agree to ensure the parallel elimination of all forms of export subsidies 
and disciplines on all export measures with equivalent effect to be 
completed by the end of 2013. This will be achieved in a progressive and 
parallel manner, to be specified in the modalities, so that a substantial part 
is realised by the end of the first half of the implementation period (WTO 
Conference, 2005). 
 
There was some internal EU debate on how to address this commitment. While the 
European Commission proposal for the 2013 CAP reform excluded the removal of 
export subsidies (see e.g. Mathews, 2012), the European Parliament development 
committee favoured their elimination (European Parliament, 2011).   However, both the 
Council and the plenary of the European Parliament supported the Commission view 
that such a commitment was subject to an agreement in the WTO DDR negotiations. 
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Since such agreement was lacking, the CAP 2013 revisions did not address export 
subsidies.  
 
In other words, the removal of export subsidies agreed in Nairobi in 2015 was 
made possible by the provision included in CAP regulations since December 1994, and 
which laid dormant until 2015. Absent this clause, the EU would have had to open a 
new legislative process to allow for such a decision. Even if the diminished differences 
between global and EU market prices had largely removed the need for export 
subsidies, the EU could not have agreed to the compromise to remove export subsidies 
absent the existing clause subordinating EU export subsidies to the limits resulting from 
an international agreement. The clause had been present since 1994, and could have 
facilitated the impact of multilateral pressure on CAP substance at any time. However, 
since the multilateral agreement to remove export subsidies was reached in 2015, our 
insight qualifies existing research on determinants of the 2013 CAP reform.  
 
The 2013 reform was, according to the dominant literature (see next section), the 
first since the 1980s where multilateral pressure appeared irrelevant. Both Swinbank 
(2015) and Daugbjerg (2017) find that at the time the EU was not expecting an 
agreement on agriculture in the WTO DDR negotiations, and the 2013 reform did not 
introduce any change that could be interpreted as facilitating a multilateral agreement. 
According to these authors, the absence of multilateral pressure allowed for a partial 
reversal of the CAP’s content. Specifically, production-related payments (practically 
eliminated in the 2008 revision) up to a maximum of 15% of the amount each state 
receives in the form of ‘Single Payments’ to farmers were reintroduced. Thus, ‘The 
direction towards a gradual increase in the WTO compatibility of the CAP achieved in 
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the period 1992/2008 stalled and domestic concerns took priority (primarily 
redistribution of support and the environment), resulting in some backtracking’ 
(Daugbjerg 2017, 498).
5
 What our research indicates is that while CAP 2013 did not 
introduce any change to facilitate an agreement in the DDR negotiations, it preserved 
the dormant clause that facilitated the multilateral agreement reached in the December 
2015 WTO Ministerial of Nairobi. By removing export subsidies in 2016, the EU 
changed the substance of the 2013 reform, resulting in a transformation of the CAP due 




If our analysis of CAP legislation shows that the influence of the Uruguay Round 
Agreement on Agriculture has been permanent, the review of the existing literature on 
CAP reform determinants shows that multilateral pressure only became a factor during 
the negotiations leading to that transfer of authority. While multilateral pressure has 
never been the only determinant of CAP reforms, and its impact (type of influence) does 
not follow a set pattern, the 1994 transfer of authority on agriculture to GATT/WTO 
increased its capacity to influence CAP. 
 
Studies looking at a specific reform, as well as those taking a comparative 
approach, have tried to pinpoint the determinants of CAP reforms (see table 3). In this 
section, we summarize and tabulate the extensive literature on this topic, presenting the 
scholarly assessments of whether one or more of the main CAP determinants influenced 
the timing (when reforms were initiated), substance (CAP instruments), funding (the 
amount of financial support for the CAP), and equity (redistribution of financial support 
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to farmers) of a particular reform. We assume that if the literature has identified a 
determinant as having an impact on a qualitative variable the absence of such a factor 
would result in a different reform. While there is no consensus among policy makers or 
researchers on all the internal factors, nor which has the greatest impact (Daugbjerg and 
Swinbank 2009; Cunha and Swinbank 2009), the literature reveals five dominant 
internal influences (the EU budget, EU enlargement, previous CAP reforms, the 
European institutional setting and paradigm shifts) and one external (multilateral 
pressure). The objective of this review is to assess when multilateral pressure exerted an 
influence on the CAP, with or without the EU domestic factors, rather than the degree 
of influence of each. We look at which factors were identified as having influenced each 
of the six CAP reforms and at their type of influence.  
 
(Table 3 here) 
 
Both quantitative and qualitative studies on the importance of multilateral 
pressure on CAP reforms have looked at how changes enabled the CAP to comply with 
third country demands. There is widespread agreement among both academics and 
practitioners that with the exception of the 1980s and 2013, rounds of multilateral trade 
negotiations (an external determinant) influenced policy changes.
6
 Daugbjerg and 
Swinbank (2007; 2009) find multilateral negotiations important in explaining the timing 
and substance of CAP reforms in the early 1990s and the early 2000s. Regarding equity, 
Henning and Latacz-Lohmann (2004, 41-42) argued – prior to the 2004 enlargement – 
that there was gridlock in the Council of Ministers of Agriculture due to differing 
preferences on multifunctionality, and extreme positions on levels of support, resulting 
in a stalemate (status-quo). However, they find that external shocks, such as further 
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pressure from further WTO restrictions, served to mitigate extreme positions, break up 
the gridlock, and make the CAP more efficient, effective and equitable. The implication 
is that multilateral pressure is a force capable of changing the CAP’s policy instruments 
and by so doing affect the redistribution of financial support among EU farmers 
(equity).  
 
However, even researchers who previously, and continuously, emphasised 
multilateral pressure deemed it irrelevant for the 2013 revision (Swinbank 2015; 
Daugbjerg 2017). The reason, they argue, is that the revision did not introduce any 
changes that facilitated, or could be interpreted as facilitating, a multilateral agreement 
in the WTO DDR negotiations. As we have evidenced in the previous section, their 
conclusion should be qualified by taking into account the multilateral agreement on 
export subsidies reached at the WTO Ministerial of December 2015. The EU decision to 
accept to remove exports subsidies was facilitated by a dormant clause included in the 
2013 CAP legislation. We therefore consider that multilateral pressure influenced the 
substance of the CAP 2013 revision. 
 
Our review of the literature indicates that internal determinants of CAP reforms 
can be divided into two groups, based on their type of influence. The first group consists 
of previous CAP reforms, the European institutional setting and paradigm shifts, and 
these determinants mostly affect substance and equity, while the budget and 
enlargement primarily influence funding, thus representing a second group.   
 
Path dependency is a key element of historical institutionalism, and suggests that 
‘present structure, or functioning, can only be understood when embedded in a historical 
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perspective’ (Daugbjerg 2009, 395). Using this theory – emphasizing a self-reinforcing 
continuation of policy or developments through a reactive sequence – scholars show 
that every CAP reform builds on or is a reaction to, a previous one (Kay, 2003; Garzon 
2006; Daugbjerg, 2009; Grant, 2010). Gradual policy layering may also explain why the 
CAP largely remained intact in its 2013 reconfiguration despite the empowerment of 
those interests who wanted the CAP to return to a more traditional mode of support 
(Daugbjerg and Swinbank 2016). Recent research also points to the emergence of ‘a 
new national path dependency re-shaping the CAP implementation’ (Henke et al 2018, 
403), which may open a new strand of research on path-dependency in the CAP. 
 
Much of the literature exploring the impact of EU institutions on reforming the 
CAP concludes that the European Commission has often played a key role, although its 
latitude to bring about change is limited (Daugbjerg 2009, 399; Lynggaard and 
Nedergaard 2009, 294). Nevertheless, scholars have mostly examined institutions in 
order to understand how the EU’s internal process leads to a CAP reform, rather than as 
a factor explaining why one took place (Garzon 2006). The focus has been on assessing 
how institutions promote, restrict, and otherwise influence decision-making on 
agricultural issues, including how the EU addresses and reconciles internal and external 
pressures. For example, Haniotis (2006) attributes different European and American 






As to paradigm shifts or ideas, constructivist scholars argue that ‘ideas informing 
the CAP have not remained the same and that expectations of what the CAP should 
deliver have changed in the course of its development’ (Lynggaard and Nedergaard 
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2009, 296). Furthermore, ‘CAP’s nature has fundamentally changed from a simple 
productivity focus to a comprehensive multi-layered policy’ (Medina and Potter 2017, 
384). The rationale informing the CAP has moved from a dependent (state-assisted) 
agriculture paradigm towards multifunctional and competitive (market liberal) 
agriculture paradigms through a ‘cumulative paradigm change’ (Daugbjerg and 
Swinbank 2011, 131). These studies have concentrated on pinpointing the evolution of 
the ideational structure prevailing at the time of each change to the CAP, in order to 
explain the underlying forces of political processes, often focusing on discursive 
developments (Potter and Tilzey 2007; Ackrill, Kay, and Morgan 2008; Lynggaard and 
Nedergaard 2009; Grant 2010). Focusing on the 2013 CAP revision, one study also 
finds that ‘at a single point in time, agricultural policies can be in line with several 
paradigms to various degrees’ while pointing out that discourses are prone to strategic 
usage (Alons and Zswaan 2015, 350). In sum, researchers recognise that the 
constructivist determinant is not a trigger for reform, but rather a constraint on the 
direction of the substance and equity.   
 
Regarding the second group of internal determinants that emerges from our 
analysis, both the budget and enlargement influence funding, and, specially in the case 
of the budget, timing.  When assessing financial influence on CAP reforms scholars 
have looked for evidence of budgetary constraints, and then logically deduced that these 
restrictions affected the CAP. It is probably the first explanatory factor for a CAP 
reform identified by the literature: ‘Until the late 1980s there was little doubt among 
CAP analysts that budgetary concern was the major driving force capable of generating 
CAP reform.’ (Daugbjerg and Swinbank 2011, 127). It has remained an explanatory 
factor for all CAP reforms because funding is affected by budgetary ceilings (Kay 2003; 
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Ackrill, Kay, and Harvey 2006; Daugbjerg and Swinbank 2011) and because ‘the desire 
to avoid major budgetary redistribution among member states is an important constraint 
in the evolution of the CAP’ (Daugbjerg 2009, 397). Thus, there is consensus that the 
budget has had a direct influence on the funding available in CAP reforms. Since each 
reform of the EU budget has prompted a negotiation on the CAP, the budget has also 
been a determinant of timing in almost all CAP reforms. However, as the 2003 reform 
shows, changes in CAP instruments may happen even without impending budget 
negotiations.  
 
As to enlargement pressure, research has focused on assessing the impact of 
enlargement on structural changes in the agricultural sector, specifically on whether 
enlargement fosters, or makes more difficult, CAP changes. Jensen et al (2009) show 
that EU enlargements have, for the most part, led to the expansion of EU agricultural 
production, and that the higher the agricultural production in a member state the less 
willing they are to reform the CAP. Henning and Latacz-Lohmann (2004, 42) find that 
the 2004 enlargement made the Council more heterogeneous in terms of the political 
interests represented, but also more supportive of higher levels of agricultural support. 
Thus ‘enlargement, at most, poses a further obstacle to reform’. However, others find 
that enlargement may promote CAP reform. Henning (2008, 41) contends that 
‘enlargement might be a driver of CAP reforms ex ante the EU’s expansion, while it is 
an obstacle to future reforms ex post’.
8
 This literature indicates that while enlargement 
had an impact on the timing of reforms in 1999, its impact was on substance in 2003 
and 2008. Moreover, enlargement has been seen as furthering the budgetary constraint 
(Cunha 2004, 155). Since the growth of the CAP’s budget has been limited since the 
1980s due to different stability mechanisms, enlargement is a constraint on the funding 
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for CAP. Furthermore, enlargement is considered irrelevant to the 2013 CAP reform 
because the latter addresses the equity problems previous enlargement agreements 
created, rather than dealing with enlargement per se.  
 
 
(Table 4 here)  
 
Our literature review of the influences on timing, substance, funding, and equity 
(table 4) lends further credence to our hypothesis. It reveals that multilateral pressure 
was not a determinant of reform prior to negotiations on the 1994 transfer of authority. 
It became a determinant with the 1992 reform, which is considered to include not only 
the regulatory changes of 1992 but also those introduced in December 1994. Therefore, 
the transfer of authority to the GATT/WTO increased the potential for multilateral 
pressure to influence the CAP. The increase in multilateral pressure capacity of 
influence after the authority transfer should however not be overestimated. While we do 
not assess the degree of influence of multilateral pressure vis-à-vis domestic EU factors 
in affecting the CAP, the literature review shows that this factor was one among several. 
After the authority transfer to WTO in agriculture, multilateral pressure did not become 
the only determinant of any specific aspect of CAP reform; most internal factors help 
explain some part of every CAP reform. In fact, only in 2003 did multilateral pressure 
influence an aspect of CAP reform (timing) that the other determinants did not. In all 
the other cases, other determinants have also influenced the same aspects of reforms to 
the CAP as multilateral pressure. Our literature review also indicates that the influence 
of multilateral pressure after the transfer does not follow a clear pattern. It has 
influenced the substance and equity in all reforms since the early 1990s, yet in 2013 it 
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just influenced substance, and it had an added impact on timing on only two occasions 




Multilateral pressure has influenced the EU agricultural sector. The CAP has evolved 
toward market-oriented policies, with less competition-distorting support systems.  This 
article has shown that while multilateral pressure is only one of several factors 
explaining CAP reforms, and its effect does not follow a set pattern, its influence 
increased concomintant with the negotiations on the 1994 transfer of authority on 
agriculture to GATT/WTO. At least on export subsidies, 21st century CAPs were 
designed to allow for and adapt to new multilateral agreements. 
 
While the last CAP reform in 2013 did not introduce any change that appeared to 
facilitate an agreement in the DDR negotiations, the EU’s Nairobi decision to accept the 
removal of export subsidies to agricultural products indicates that the reform did allow 
for change.  2013 CAP regulations included a clause, long dormant, that allowed for 
such a decision, and we showed that this clause on export subsidies had been in place 
since 1994. Following the 1994 international Agreement on Agriculture, all reforms of 
the CAP were designed to take into account the multilateral level, at least regarding 
export subsidies. In short, we show that multilateral pressure has had an impact on all 
CAP reforms since 1992. This finding qualifies the literature regarding multilateral 
pressure on the 2013 CAP reform. Furthermore, from an international relations 
viewpoint, this study evidences that the transfer of authority to international institutions, 
here from one institution (the EU) to another (GATT/WTO), where the former is taken 
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as the ‘domestic’ setting, may transform an external factor into a permanent influence 
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Table 1. The six CAP reforms 
Reform Type of substantive changes 
1980s Modification of existing instruments 
1992 Introduction of new instruments and 
modification of existing ones 
1999 Modification of existing instruments 
27 
 
2003 Introduction of new instruments and 
modification of existing ones 
2008 Modification of existing instruments 
2013 Modification of existing instruments 
 
Source: Own elaboration on the grounds of the literature cited in table 3. 
 
Table 2. CAP Regulations and Export subsidies dormant clause 
CAP Reforms EU Regulations  Export subsidies dormant 
clause 
1992 1766/92 Cereals 







3290/94 All products  
Case Cereals (same 
article/different number for 
each product in Annex II) 
Art.13 ….on the basis of 
quotations or prices for those 
products on the world market 
and within the limits 
resulting from agreements 
concluded in accordance 
with Article 228 of the 
Treaty, the difference 
between those quotations or 
prices and prices in the 
Community may be covered 
by export refunds. 
 
1999 1254/99 Bovine meat 
1493/99  Wine 
 
Art. 33 (1) idem 
Art 63 (1)  idem 
2003 1784/2003 Cereals 
1785/2003 Rice 
Art 13 (1) idem 
Art. 13 (1) idem 
2006 318/2006  Sugar Art. 32(1) idem 
2008 1234/2007 All products Art. 162 (1) ídem 
2013 1308/2013 All products Art.196(1) ídem 
Source: Own elaboration 
 









Swinbank and Tanner 
(1996): 1992 reform 
Coleman and Tangermann 
(1999): 1992 reform 
Swinbank and Tranter 
(2004): 1992 reform 
Nedergaard (2006): 2003 
reform 
Josling (2008): 2003 reform 
Swinnen (2008): 2003 
reform 
Daugbjerg and Swinbank 
(2011): 2008 reform 
Swinbank (2015): 2013 
reform 
Meunier (2005): reforms 1980s till 
2003 
Garzon (2006): reforms 1980s till 
2003 
Daugbjerg and Swinbank (2007): 
1992, 1999 and 2003 reforms 
Ackrill et al (2008): reforms 1980s 
till 2003 
Daugbjerg and Swinbank (2009): 
1992, 1999 and 2003 reforms  
Cunha and Swinbank (2011): 1992, 
1999 and 2003 reforms 
Daugbjerb (2017): reforms  1992 
until 2013 
Budget pressure Matthews (2015): 2013 
reform 
Ackrill et al (2008): reforms 1980s 
till 2003 
Enlargement Henning and Latcz-
Lohmann (2004): 2003 
reform 
Cunha (2004): 2003 reform 
 
Henning (2008):  2003 and 2008 
reforms  
Jensen et al (2009): 1992 and 2003 
reforms 





Path dependency Henke et al (2018): 2013 
reform 
Kay (2003):  reforms  up until 
2003 
Daugbjerg (2009): CAP reforms 
from 1990s to 2008 
Daugbjerg and Swinbank (2016): 
reforms since the 1980s 
Institutional 
setting 
Haniotis (2006): 2003 
reform 
Nedergaard (2006): 2003 
reform 
Daugbjerg and Swinbank (2007): 
1992, 1999 and 2003 reforms   
 
Ideas Alons and Zwaan (2015): 
2013 reform 
Potter and Tilzey (2007): reforms 
between 1980 and 2003 
Lynggaard and Nedergaard (2009): 
reforms between 1980 and 2003 
Daugbjerg and Swinbank (2009): 
1992, 1999 and 2003 reforms   
Medina and Potter (2017): all 
reforms  







Table 4. Determinants’ impact on timing, substance, funding and equity (drawn from 
the literature review and results from section 3). 
 












































































Source: Own elaboration on the ground of table 2 bibliography and results from section 3. 
 
 
                                                          
1
 Under the new Dispute Settlement Mechanism non-compliance with WTO agreements 
leads to retaliation from other membres. There is literature on how the EU sugar regime 
(for exemple) has changed to comply with decisions from the WTO judicial arm (see 
Swinbank, 2016).  
2
 Since the focus here is on multilateral pressure, we do not distinguish between reforms 




                                                                                                                                                                          
3
 There were some new developments regarding the CAP in late 2017. The mid-term 
review of the EU’s financial perspectives led to technical changes in the CAP 2013 
regulations through the Omnibus Agricultural Provisions Regulation (EU) 2017/2393. 
4
 See for exemple Matthews, 2013. Following the EU notifications on export subsidies 
to the WTO, the EU totally stopped using this instrument in 2014/15 (G/AG/N/EU/29). 
In 2012/13 export subsidies were just used for one product (G/AG/N/EU/22) and in 
2013/14 they were almost non-existent (G/AG/N/EU/25).  
5
 Daugbjerg and Swinbank (2016, 276) recognise, however, that the policy reversal in 
2013 was very limited since the stalemate in the DDR (since 2008) could potentially 
have allowed a reversal of the CAP back to its 1992 version (which already allowed the 
CAP to comply with the Uruguay Round’s Agreement on Agriculture). 
6
 Accepting that multilateral pressure plays a role in explaining CAP revisions does not 
mean considering that this role is predominant. Jean-Christophe Bureau claims on 
CAPReform.eu (‘Does the WTO discipline really constrain the design of CAP 
payments?’, October 23, 2017) that: “In the past, the WTO constraint has often been 
used by Member States as well as the Commission to justify policies that were largely 
self-imposed. … In reality, all major CAP reforms were driven much more by domestic 
constraints than the WTO. …”.  
7
 It is interesting to note that analysts agree that farm organisations have become less 
powerful in the process. Grant (2010, p 36) argues that the terrain ‘has been occupied by 
environmental, third world and consumer organizations’. 
8
 Lovec and Erjavec (2013) nonetheless recently find that enlargements may have an 
expost impact on CAP reforms. In particular, they argue that the 2004 enlargement – by 
shifting the geographical distribution of production (primarily eastward) – explains the 
increased flexibility of payment schemes. 
